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Utility contra utilitarianism: Holbach’s international ethics 
 
Introduction 
Radical re-interpretations of the Enlightenment have been in vogue in the past decade. Israel (2001, 
2006) and Onfray (2007) have spearheaded the popularisation of little-read radical thinkers of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while Frazer (2010) and Jeffery (2011) have reconceptualised 
theories of moral sentiments. These scholars propose re-interpretations of well-known thinkers, 
notably Spinoza, Hume, Diderot, Adam Smith, Vico, Herder, and Kant; but also provide insights on 
less well-known thinkers outside of the history of ideas scholarship, such as Bayle, Meslier, La 
Mettrie, Helvétius and Holbach. These thinkers’ writings shook the foundations of philosophy, 
political thought and, as I will show here, international relations theory during their time. In this 
article, I focus on the utilitarian international ethics of Paul-Henri Thiry, baron d’Holbach (Holbach 
for short). Kors (1976) and Hulliung (1994) have established the importance of Holbach’s 
contribution to French and European thought in the second half of the eighteenth century, notably 
through his social circle which gathered in his salon (the infamous and ill-named coterie 
holbachique), his polemical writings of the 1760s, his scientific articles published in the Encyclopédie, 
his philosophical, ethical and political writings of the 1770s, and his reception by many other 
authors, notably Jefferson, Hegel and Marxi. In this last decade, Holbach put forward a nuanced, pre-
Benthamite theory of utilitarian ethics, which he applied to international relations. This article will, in 
the first part, detail his international utilitarian ethics, showing how it differs from (later) theories of 
utilitarianism; as well as show the importance of virtue in his ethical thought. There, Holbach shows 
that the dichotomy between self-interest and virtuous behaviour is misguided – a point of particular 
importance for international relations scholarship. In the second part, this article engages the most 
nuanced understanding of utilitarianism in international relations, more specifically the works of 
Hoogensen who, among others, sought to redress the injustice done to Bentham’s thought in the 
field. Comparing Holbach’s and Bentham’s international relations theory, this article shows why 
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Holbach is more relevant than Bentham for debates around international ethics – as opposed to 
Bentham’s focus on international security. In the third part, this article addresses Holbach’s 
relevance for international relations theory and international ethics today, by showing the relative 
worth of his contribution against realist, liberal, and constructivist theories. It then answers the 
challenges raised against utilitarianism by Walzer, before considering Holbach’s materialist 
contribution to international ethics.  
Holbach’s utilitarian ethics 
From ‘utility’ to utilitarian thought 
‘on French soil, one finds utilitarian arguments 
everywhere, utilitarianism nowhere.’ (Hulliung 
1994: 19) 
 
Holbach is neither unique, nor the first, to use utilitarian arguments. From Leibniz onwards, there 
are a plethora of authors who talk of utility, and for whom the concept is more or less central 
(Hruschka, 1991: 166). Although Bentham is often considered as the founder of utilitarianism, there 
is clearly a whole tradition, stretching back to the end of the seventeenth century, which had taken 
utility as an ethical concept very seriously. It is beyond the scope of this article to investigate this 
tradition, but Bentham himself, in a letter to Voltaire in 1776, refers to Beccaria and Helvétius – both 
of whom had attended Holbach’s salon – as authors providing the ‘foundation of utility’ before him 
(Burns, 1968: 367). Holbach is central in this pre-Benthamite utilitarian tradition for two reasons. 
Firstly he comes at the end of it – his last works, written in 1776, were published just before 
Bentham’s major works, notably the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation first 
printed in 1780 – and is thus able to reflect on much of the tradition before him. Secondly, he wrote 
extensively about international ethics, the area this article focuses on, and applied utilitarian 
principles to it.  
 What is utility in Holbach’s thought? The use of the term appears in his first publication, the 
Christianisme dévoilé written in 1761, where it is used in the polemics against the power of the 
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(Catholic) Church and Christian ethic more widely (Holbach, [1761] 1998: 72). As Hulliung (1994: 20) 
rightly notes, it is an opposition to the Church’s unproductive use of land that cements utility in 
French eighteenth-century thought. But such negative uses of the term against the Church’s 
uselessness (inutilité) hardly make Holbach’s thought utilitarian. One will have to wait until his works 
of the 1770s to find more positive uses of the term, and a genuine utilitarian ethic to develop. In the 
Essai sur les préjugés (1770), Holbach uses the ‘greatest number’ formula that is so characteristic of 
utilitarian thought. True opinions, for Holbach, are not judged only by experience and reason, but 
also if they are ‘really and constantly advantageous for the greatest number’ (Holbach, [1770a] 
1999: 9) This will be repeated in a slightly different format in the Politique Naturelle (1773) where 
Holbach claims that whatever the form of government, it ‘will be good when it will bring happiness 
to the greatest number’ (Holbach [1773a] 2001: 382). This reference to the greatest number 
formula, however, never translates itself into a rational calculation of interests (Crimmins, 1996: 
754). This is primarily because it is not rationality that grounds our interests in Holbach’s thought, 
but our self-love coupled with our natural sociability. In the words of Hulliung (1994: 17):  
If utilitarianism had to depend on rational self-interest it would fail; fortunately, we can 
dispense with a calculus of felicity because our passions are better than our interests – 
better at making us care about those for whom we feel sympathy, those nearest us, but also, 
potentially, anyone who shares our human condition. 
 As Frazer (2010) and Jeffrey (2011) have noted, Hume, Adam Smith, (the early) Kant and Herder all 
had a similar recourse to sympathy to ground the moral sentiments, combining elements of self-love 
and sociability into one simple concept.  
 Here we find an important distinction between Holbach and Bentham’s conception of utility. 
Although there is much debate about what utility is in Bentham’s thought, his works refer to a 
certain calculating aspect of utility, for example the ‘sum total of his pleasures’ or the ‘sum total of 
his pains’ (Bentham, 1996: 12). Such a calculation of interests, through pleasures and pains, is 
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entirely absent from Holbach’s thought, and misses the importance of sociability in determining an 
ethics of utility. Holbach is much more concerned, at the political level, with the absence of pain 
than with a calculus of pleasures and pains. This distinction is essential as Holbach is closer to a 
model of ataraxia à la Epicurus, than to a positivist calculus of interest, which ‘utilitarians’ in 
economics and neo-utilitarians in international relations have discussed (Ruggie, 1998: 855). Against 
such a calculation, Holbach prefers the language of happiness which refers to a durable state of 
being. At the individual level, his utilitarian thought is not about the acquisition of pleasures, but 
about the minimising of pains, and about the general consequences that bring one to happiness thus 
defined. This means that at the international level, Holbach’s utilitarian ethics is not be used to 
further the positive interests of some over others simply because of a higher aggregate level of 
happiness; but it may be used to justify intervention when particular situations create intolerable 
pains and sufferings, or make a life of happiness impossible.  
 In contrast to other efficiency-driven models of utilitarianism, Holbach’s eudæmonist ethic is 
not built on human rationality, but on the ideal of sociability. Rousseau had famously disagreed with 
the philosophes on this point, but Holbach attempts one more defence of man’s natural sociability 
against the ascetic model of the state of nature suggested by Rousseau (Wokler, 1978: 117). For 
Holbach, humans never live outside society, as they cannot be happy alone. Holbach’s ethical theory 
is unashamedly a theory of reciprocity and of necessity. We are necessarily social beings who need 
others, and we cannot interest them in our own happiness without making them happy in return. 
Therefore, we have a duty to render them happy, a duty enshrined in our own need for happiness, 
and the virtuous cycle of happiness is complete.  
Holbach’s thought in this respect is not limited to an ethical theory, it is not primarily about 
what one ought to do, but rather it is a universal claim about the way humans act; i.e. always 
according to what they believe is in their interest. As such, it is not only the good or virtuous action, 
nor is it the rational action that seeks its own interest, but every human action. Human beings can of 
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course be wrong, irrational, bad, etc.; yet they always do so with the belief that it is their interest 
that they are seeking. It is our desires, whether real or imaginary, that drive our interests (Holbach, 
[1776b] 2004: 343). Holbach is not proposing a rational choice theory, whereby we calculate that our 
self-interest is best achieved by such-and-such means, but rather he is putting forward an 
ontological claim about what it means to be human; what I call a theory of the immanence of 
interest.  
It is evident already that utility, as defined by Holbach, is already a social theory and not an 
individual theory. Since it is about interests, it has direct applications to the international level, 
which has been concerned with state interest at its very core. Unlike some theories of international 
relations that divorce state interests from ethical concerns, Holbach’s theory never severs that link 
and insists on the necessity of cultivating virtues, even at the international level. 
Virtue ethics and international relations 
Debates about virtues are not widespread in international ethics. Since virtues are found in 
individuals, it is difficult to make a link between them and wider international concerns. It is clear, 
however, that there were competing virtues in the eighteenth century, such as those based on moral 
sentiments in Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith (Frazer 2010; Jeffery 2011) or the eudæmonist 
virtues of utilitarian thinkers, including Meslier, Helvétius, Diderot and Holbach (Israel 2010). 
Holbach’s virtues clearly apply to international ethics, but what are they? A virtue is a ‘habitual and 
permanent will or disposition’. It is acquired through habit, or repetitive action, and contributes to 
one’s future actions – through the will – and to one’s character more generally – as a disposition. 
This definition is much closer to an Aristotelian understanding of virtues than to a Christian one. This 
is not a surprise, given Holbach’s avowed atheism. But it does differentiate him from Bentham, who 
had ‘subsequently changed his mind such that the notion of virtue drops from his thinking and 
human beings only function with regard to self-preference’ (Hoogensen, 2005: 26). In Holbach there 
is no such antagonism between self-interest and virtue. Virtue is not defined as ‘other-regarding’ or 
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‘self-less’, but as a constant feature of one’s character, as an internalisation of common interest as 
part of self-interest. Holbach’s republicanism is grounded on this notion of virtue, as publicly-spirited 
individuals will take an active interest in the affairs of the polity, whose interests they perceive as 
their own. Holbach here may be over-optimistic about the applicability of such a principle to the 
international domain. Perhaps it is possible to achieve this level of public spirit at the level of a 
particular republic, but is it possible to achieve it for the international level as well? To answer this 
challenge, Holbach relies on two central virtues that are applicable beyond the interests of one’s 
republic: the virtues of humanity and justice. 
 ‘The first of social virtues is humanity’ (Holbach, [1773a] 2001: 367). Holbach’s virtue ethics 
proposes a universal application of its principles. This virtue is certainly present within the limits of 
one’s society, but it is not confined by these boundaries as it applies to all members of our species – 
to humanity. At the international level, it is defined as ‘love, charity, liberality, indulgence and pity’. 
These principles are of course too vague to guide international ethics adequately, and Holbach’s 
thought remains too abstract here. It is possible, however, to piece together Holbach’s thought and 
to expand on his definitions. Given Holbach’s concern for material well-being of the least 
advantaged, and his constant critique of the abuses on the poor, taken together with this virtue of 
humanity which includes charity and liberality, it is reasonable to conclude that there is some form 
of international obligation to provide the material necessities to life, and to help create conditions 
under which happiness is possible. Holbach is here a humanitarian thinker before humanitarian 
concerns were on the international agenda. The virtue of humanity, taken together with Holbach’s 
eudæmonism, provides the foundations for a utilitarian defence of humanitarian aid, and even 
possibly humanitarian intervention. If all human beings share some basic equal needs – food and 
shelter, for example – then these needs demand intervention from those who possess this virtue of 
humanity. Utility is certainly greatly improved when those who have nothing are given the basic 
necessities to strive for their own happiness.  
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If humanity is the virtue of humans per se, justice is the virtue of humans living in society. As 
every other virtue, justice supposes reciprocity. Holbach ([1768] 1998: 235) claims that ‘a man is just 
when he has a permanent will to give his fellow human beings what they are due and to treat them 
according to their merit.’ Justice is, first and foremost, a virtue – a habituated quality – that pushes 
humans to give other humans their due. Justice is inevitably linked to utility in Holbach’s thought. 
Laws, he claims, cannot be just if they only have in mind the utility of the few (Holbach, [1773a] 
2001: 359). Justice is the basis of all social virtues, and without it no society can subsist for long. In 
this vision, there is no room for utilitarian calculations that violate the virtues, and in particular these 
two fundamental virtues: those of humanity and justice. Holbach’s ethics is centred on virtues and 
utility is only good insofar as it allows the virtues to flourish, insofar as it helps create citizens that 
are habituated towards being useful to others. The sacrifice of the few for the good of the many is 
therefore not useful, as it violates the virtues of humanity and justice whose utility is essential for 
social life. Such an argument is extended to the international realm, as Holbach claims that this 
argument is applicable to relations between peoples. 
 
Holbach’s international thought versus Bentham’s 
Bentham the international relations theorists, Holbach the international ethicist 
‘Bentham has hitherto been one of the most 
neglected of the eighteenth century philosophers. 
His name is a household word; he is universally 
acknowledged to be one of the founders of modern 
utilitarianism’ (Hoogensen, 2005: 40) 
 
If Bentham has been neglected, Holbach has been ignored by most commentators. Bentham is 
certainly known for his utilitarianism, but he is often misunderstood, and his contribution to 
international relations is not an exception to this rule (Hobsbawm 1992: 27; Hoogensen 2001; Kaino 
2008). Hoogensen shows that Bentham’s thought does not easily ‘fit’ within the traditions of 
international relations, particularly the two dominant traditions: realism and liberalism. Bentham 
8 
 
has ‘liberal’ features: ‘he detested war, thought commerce promoted peace, and respected notions 
of international law’; but he also it thought of as ‘a realist because of his emphasis on self-interest’ 
(Hoogensen, 2005: 9). Perhaps this is most striking because Bentham was not only describing 
relations between states but was the first to attempt to come up with a ‘Universal Jurisprudence’ 
(Armitage, 2011).  
Hoogensen shows that there is a meaningful way to look at the thought of historical thinkers, 
and to learn from their thought for contemporary theories. She shows that Bentham is a complex 
thinker, and one that firmly belongs to the realm of international relations because of the central 
role that security plays in his thought; in particular the security of expectation (Bentham, 1914: 124; 
Hoogensen, 2005: 12). Contrary to Bentham’s study of international security, Holbach’s international 
thought is more concerned with the role that ethics should play. Holbach’s thought merits more 
attention than it receives, as the ‘principle of utility was barely discussed in Bentham’s 1786-89 
international writings’ (Hoogensen, 2005: 95). Holbach is not only important to the historian of ideas 
because he wrote before Bentham, he is important to scholars of international ethics because he 
explicitly linked his utilitarian thought to international matters. Holbach had already discussed many 
of the themes that Bentham develops, and in many cases Bentham reaches the same conclusions. 
This is not surprising given their common concern for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
There are, however, important differences between the two thinkers, and these help build a more 
thorough understanding of the utilitarian tradition in international relations. 
Security and liberty 
‘Bentham places security as one of the four 
subordinate ends of the greatest happiness 
principle, and ultimately the most important 
end’ (Hoogensen, 2005: 12) 
 
Since security is central in Bentham’s utilitarianism, it is important to ascertain its role in Holbach’s, 
and highlight the difference between the two thinkers. Holbach never speaks of security as such, but 
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there is a central role for safety in his thought. The difference between security and safety may seem 
to be mainly semantic, but it actually reflects an important difference of emphasis between Holbach 
and Bentham. In Holbach’s thought (1999: 251), safety is defined as one of the three political 
interests shared by the greatest number – along with liberty and property. Bentham had defined 
security as protection against the misdeeds of other individuals: whether they are citizens, public 
functionaries or foreign adversaries (Hoogensen, 2005: 13). Such a definition of security is too 
narrow for Holbach. There is nowhere the sense that safety is uniquely about intentional acts by 
other individuals, or that safety is negative – as protection against others. In the paragraph 
dedicated to safety in Holbach’s Politique Naturelle ([1773a] 2001: 488), he insists that individuals’ 
safety is about having the ‘things necessary to their needs and that make their existence pleasant’; it 
implies a capacity for happiness, and safety can be understood in a positive sense as providing the 
necessary means for existence. We move away from security concerns, largely focused on (armed) 
protection against interference, and towards safety concerns, focused in part on material well-being 
and one’s capacity to live a life of happiness. 
 Bentham had rightly been sceptical of the possibility of reconciling the conflicting values of 
liberty and security. As Rosen (1983: 156) points out, Bentham’s focus on security over liberty is 
aimed at showing that one’s real interests lie in security rather than liberty. But Holbach ([1770b] 
1999: 252) had already made that point, he had clearly stated that members of society must 
‘renounce a portion of their natural liberty’. This point is emphasised in Holbach’s works, as it is a 
part of the social contract to determine, according to the preferences and needs of each particular 
society, what the balance between liberty, safety and property is to look like (Devellennes, 2013). 
Bentham’s emphasis on security over liberty is here unconvincing; for Holbach this should not be 
judged a priori, but the consequences of such a preference have to be taken into account. While 
some cases may warrant more security than liberty, others will warrant the opposite. Holbach, by 




Sovereignty, an international contract, and a universal league 
‘A universal league should arm all nations to 
crush these monsters that, with a view of 
acquiring a few scraps of land that they will 
govern badly, make a game out of making 
millions of soldiers perish.’ (Holbach, 
[1776a] 2001: 622) 
 
If security is merely a subordinate end of utility, then there should be limits upon sovereignty, limits 
that are dictated by utility itself. Bentham’s conception of sovereignty seems too absolute, here, for 
a utilitarian international ethics. For Bentham, the ‘sovereign then [is the one] who has the physical 
power of occupying and traversing a given tract of land [… conferring him] dominion de facto over 
the greater part of the natives’ (Bentham, 1843: 542). This conception of sovereignty is largely 
unlimited in the thought of Bentham. Holbach provides a more coherent international framework, 
from the standpoint of utility, as even external sovereignty (non-interference into another 
sovereign’s territory) is subject to the dictates of utility.  
 Holbach had argued at the level of the social contract that individuals need to surrender a 
part of their personal freedom under the terms of the contract. Equally, at the international level, 
Holbach ([1773a] 2001: 360) argues for a surrender of sovereignty in favour of ‘the right of all other 
nations taken collectively’. This version of the international social contract demands a trade-off 
between individual liberty and common utility. A state will have to accept a loss of sovereignty for 
the good of the society of states as whole. In his international social contract, Holbach ([1773a] 
2001: 360) therefore promotes a form of collective security. In order to enforce the respect of the 
contract by all, ‘the united forces of all societies could execute the law or the will of all’. These limits 
on sovereignty are much closer to the debates in international ethics today than Bentham’s focus on 
absolute external sovereignty.  Holbach is here explicitly critical of the ‘realist’ notion of the balance 
of power. It cannot hold, Holbach claims, without abiding by the rules of justice. This balance of 
power cannot produce its desired effect as each sovereign tries to tip the balance in its favour under 
the pretext of maintaining it (Holbach, [1773a] 2001: 559).  
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Instead of a balance of power, Holbach ([1773a] 2001: 558) makes a concrete proposal. The 
‘grand society’ of nations needs to contain those who are dangerous for humankind. This can only be 
done if there exists a power to constrain sovereign to act in a just manner, and this can be achieved 
through a tribunal to settle disputes. As Meyerfeld (2012: 290) has shown, a similar conclusion can 
come from a reading of Hobbes and Locke, as they demand an impartial arbitrator or judge for inter-
state conflict. Bentham will advocate for a very similar organ when he defends a common tribunal to 
apply moral sanctions to state action (Hoogensen, 2005: 86). If Bentham remains vague on this topic, 
as Hoogensen notes, so does Holbach. The idea of a ‘confederation against injustice’ (Holbach, 
[1773a] 2001: 559) lacks clarity, and can only be a starting point for considering what it would look 
like in practice. But in Holbach it clearly has common institutions, common laws, a guiding moral 
code under the – rather vague – terms of justice and utility, it poses limits on sovereignty and can 
call for a just war. 
War and peace 
Holbach’s aversion towards warfare does not make him exclude its possibility altogether from 
international affairs. There are several possibilities for legitimate warfare to arise, and collective 
security is but one of them. If entering an international social contract requires a surrender of 
sovereignty, giving up one’s rights – including one’s rights as a nation – has limits that should never 
be crossed. Nature, Holbach claims, allows the attacked, the oppressed and the rejected to take all 
means for their conservation. Nations should therefore only take up arms for their own defence, 
safety, or for legitimate causes (Holbach, [1773b] 2004: 189). Holbach ([1773b] 2004: 190) further 
expands on this concept of legitimate causes, and he is adamant that it excludes any kind of 
conquest or expansion. The only legitimate right to war, therefore, is for defensive purposes - 
understood rather largely. Legitimate defence indeed includes repelling an unjust adversary, 
repressing a frenzied nation, holding back a conqueror, or even suppressing plots of envious 
neighbours in their infancy (Holbach, [1773a] 2001: 548). Just war can be understood to include the 
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possibility of pre-emptive warfare, as it did in Bentham’s thought (Conway, 1989), but Holbach never 
goes as far as to argue for preventive warfare, whereby the very acquisition of military power is 
cause for legitimate war.  
Yet, even this rather wide definition of just war as ius ad bellum includes strict limits on the 
conduct of war as ius in bello. Enemies are still human beings, and Holbach’s ([1776b] 2004: 430) 
virtue of humanity demands that fighting be limited to weakening enemies and not crushing them 
altogether. Holbach also praises the move towards more humane treatment of prisoners and the 
end of the ‘barbaric’ practices of the past. Thankfully, Holbach ([1776b] 2004: 513) notes, the voice 
of humanity is heard even in the midst of battles. Certainly, the killing of non-combatants is excluded 
from such just warfare, and even defeated combatants deserve the humanity of their vanquisher 
(Holbach, [1776b] 2004: 572). As a reward for the observation of these rules of just war, Holbach 
expresses a faith in natural rewards. Those who obey the rules of justice, he believes, will be 
rewarded by abundance, prosperity and peace (Holbach, [1773a] 2001: 361). Such faith in 
providential rewards can seem to be at odds with other beliefs of the atheist philosophe. It is difficult 
to believe, furthermore, that ‘Nature’ will punish those who transgress the rules of justice. One 
needs to remember, however, that ‘Nature’ as Holbach refers to it here, includes human actions as 
well as natural phenomena (Doyle, 2010: 101; Holbach [1770b] 1999: 167-173). Holbach remains 
unconvincing, however, and he is at pains to reconcile his belief that justice will prevail with the 
rewards that injustice can bring. The faith of Enlightenment thinkers in the workings of providence 
seems odd today, but his call for human, international justice remains a valid concern in 
international ethics. Bentham here is more convincing than Holbach, as he sticks to the language of 
interests and thus avoids the pitfalls of a belief in natural progress (Hoogensen, 2005: 66; 
Haakonssen, 2008: 81). This contradiction in Holbach’s thought, who had largely focused on interests 




Bentham’s thought on the role of commerce in international politics is ambivalent at best. In some 
cases he argues for as few limits on trade as possible, in others he argues that rivalries of commerce 
lead to war (Hoogensen, 2005: 107). Holbach is much more consistent in his argument that 
commercial interests are often at the detriment of peace. Two commercial nations, he claims, 
cannot be friends for a long time (Holbach, [1773a] 2001: 552). Building on his disagreement with 
the belief that private vices lead to public virtues (which he found in Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees), 
Holbach ([1776b] 2004: 325) takes his case to the international level by arguing that there is no 
reason to believe that states in pursuit of their own commercial interests will somehow ‘harmonise’ 
these potentially conflicting interests in times of trouble. On the contrary, if commercial nations 
follow their own interests, clashes, rather than harmonisation, are more likely to be the outcome of 
recurring self-centred action. Such a challenge to the ‘liberal’ belief in a harmony of commercial 
interests is potently pointed out in Holbach’s thought, without ambiguity or hesitation. Finally, one 
area where Bentham’s thought was more convincing than Holbach’s was in his approach to the 
colonies. Although Holbach makes vague mentions of colonial policy in the Politique Naturelle 
(Holbach, [1773a] 2001: 519-22), his thought remains in its infancy in this area.  
 
Contemporary applications of Holbach’s international ethics 
Mark Amstutz (2008: 1) claims that ‘the realist notion that international politics is fundamentally a 
quest for political power and economic interests is false and untenable’. This is likely to be the first 
thing that a student of international ethics reads, and yet it is full of assumptions that a reading of 
Holbach easily dispels. The centrality of interests in human nature is key to Holbach, and it avoids 
falling into the pitfall of trying to argue against interest. Doubtless there are serious challenges to 
Holbach’s theory of interests, but his thought emerged within a context where the claims of 
Christian morality were fundamentally opposed to the idea that self-interest could be the source of 
morality. Most of the French eighteenth-century philosophes were in disagreement with a central 
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tenet of the orthodox conception of morality of their day. Holbach’s primary concern in this respect 
is that by accepting the duality between self-interest and morality, one falls prey to a flawed 
conception of morality. Holbach’s argument is aimed at a Christian aversion to self-interest, but this 
aversion is still present, albeit in a securalised manner, in contemporary ethics and international 
ethics – starting with Kant. Denying that self-interest has a powerful sway over our actions is bound 
to create cynicism about moral approaches. This is the Nietzschean critique of morality for which 
disinterested actions are a myth (Connolly, 1991; Newman, 2007). It is this intuition about human 
action being essentially self-interested that is hard to ignore, and the contemporary literature on 
international ethics often fails to address the seriousness of this issue adequately. Yet Holbach had 
already proposed a theory that posed itself as an alternative to the ascetic, self-sacrificial morality so 
difficult to maintain in international relations. He proposed to recognise the power of self-interest to 
create virtuous behaviour, by actively and politically tying self-interest with the interest of the 
collective. The ground of self-interest cannot be abandoned to realism, for it is too strong a motive 
to be ignored by ethics.   
Holbach versus contemporary international theories 
Realism is widely understood as the theory that makes this point about self-interest most potently. 
As Barry Buzan (1996: 54) notes, ‘both classical realism and neo-realism borrow consciously from 
microeconomic theory, seeing states as analogous to firms, anarchic structure as analogous to 
market structure, and power as analogous to utility.’ But the workings of the anarchic structure are 
not any more straightforward than the workings of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, and the 
recourse to utility of microeconomic theory is a long way from the utilitarian vision of Holbach. Self-
interest is important, but it is problematised in Holbach’s thought in a way that is not the case of 
realist theories. A sacrifice of immediate self-interest is perfectly justifiable in a virtue ethics based 
on utility. Debates around a post-Westphalian state system, where the norms of the international 
15 
 
community are not perceived as exogenously given but rather as constituted through 
interdependent relations (Frost 1996), certainly follow this line of thinking.  
There are other theories of international relations that insist that self-interest of nations is 
compatible with ethical behaviour. Liberal institutionalism is one of these theories, tying commercial 
interests with collective peace and security. Yet here Holbach’s virtue ethics opposes itself to this 
faith in the ability of private vices to turn into public virtues. His criticism of Mandeville’s Fables of 
the Bees (which preceded Adam Smith’s similar point in the Wealth of Nations), taken to the 
international stage, allows one to argue that if each nation pursues its own economic interest, there 
is no guarantee that it will be in the interest of the greatest number. Holbach’s utilitarian humanism, 
as a universal doctrine, does not look favourably at any kind of order that prioritises the utility of 
some at the expense of others. The interests of the few (and particularly of the rich) are not an 
adequate basis for an ethical system under Holbach’s utilitarian theory, and there is no need for a 
rational model of calculation of utility to use utility as a critical tool to displace such belief in the 
harmonisation of vicious, self-oriented interest (Schofield, 2004: 381).  
 Holbach’s belief in the possibility of self-interested ethics is thus not straightforward, in that 
it refutes two of the major international relations theories on the importance of self-interest. 
Perhaps then it is his capacity to problematise interest that is uniquely relevant in moral terms. John 
Ruggie (1998) makes the point that neo-utilitarianism is challenged by the constructivist position in 
international relations theory, precisely along similar lines. He argues that constructivism 
problematises interests and does not take them as exogenously given – which is the case for neo-
utilitarian theories. It is clear, however, that the use of the term utilitarian by Ruggie is the one that I 
am challenging in this article. Holbach, in contrast with the ‘neo-utilitarian’ traditions which 
encompass both neo-realist and neo-liberal theories, provides a much more nuanced picture of the 
possibility of self-interest in morality. Holbach was not a ‘constructivist’, but his critique of interest, 
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and his struggle to get to the bottom of what is really in one’s interest, is shared by constructivists 
today (Wendt, 1992; Erskine, 2012; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2012).  
Holbach’s view cannot easily fit within the methodological individualism pre-supposed by 
realism and liberal internationalism. There is, in a sense, no logical link between this methodological 
individualism and a utilitarian theory of ethics, and Holbach provides a clear alternative when he 
posits the social nature of human beings. Self-interests, we recall, are enshrined in a conception of 
reciprocal self-interests, grounded in the belief that humans cannot be happy on their own. This is 
Holbach’s starting point, and when applied at the international level, it makes the claim that 
supposedly autonomous states are actually dependent upon one another and cannot escape this 
fact of co-existence. Holbach, who reacted against Rousseau’s critique of dependence as a source of 
corruption, clear rejects the conclusions of the Genevan philosopher. Against the conception of 
autarky defended by Rousseau (Nili, 2011), dependence, Holbach argues, is natural, and states 
cannot hope to strive for the autonomy required by Rousseau’s republicanism, or by the 
‘Westphalian’ – a term that Holbach does not use – state system. Holbach’s thought is in sharp 
contrast with an international relations theory that values state sovereignty as an absolute principle, 
and contemporary critics of the Westphalian system make similar points to Holbach when they 
argue that this system is unrealistically (and perhaps ahistoristically) based on an absolutisation of 
autonomy as a model for states (Krasner, 1995-6: 115).  
Holbach’s ethics provides us with critical tools to address the issue of self-interest in 
international politics, as well as the issue of autonomy of states. It is Holbach’s categorical refusal of 
free will, at the level of the individual, which best explains this rejection of the principle of autonomy 
at the international level. For Holbach ([1770b] 1999: 290), the individual is determined by nature 
and social circumstances, and free will becomes impossible. The same rationale is applied at the 
level of the state, for states cannot be free in the absolute sense that is required by a conception of 
free will. It is our belief in free will that is the source of our prejudice in favour of the autonomous 
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nation state. Autonomy of state power makes no more sense than freedom of the will for this 
materialist philosopher. States cannot be autonomous for they are part of a material world 
comprised of individuals and other states. They are, just as much as any other entity, subject to the 
laws of ethics, and required to adhere by the standards of utility.  
Even for international ethicists that go beyond this battle of international theories, very few 
have taken utilitarian theories seriously enough. Michael Walzer (1977) is probably the one that took 
the utilitarian challenge most seriously, especially in terms of its arguments in favour (and against) 
preventive war. Following Bacon’s defence of preventive war, Walzer identifies two utilitarian 
criteria in defence of such line of action. The first, quite historically specific to Bacon’s time, is the 
belief that the balance of power plays an active role in the preservation of liberty in Europe. Such an 
argument, as Walzer highlights, is an argument against the alternative model of a universal 
monarchy. A balance of power is seen to be a check on the ambition of some monarchs to rule the 
territories of others. Secondly, utilitarians might argue that fighting early tips the balance in a 
decisive way, and considerably reduces the cost involved in fighting the war at a later stage. So far, 
we are still in the ‘traditional’ understanding of utilitarian thought. These are almost purely 
instrumental reasonings, which could be quantified. Yet Walzer sees a third utilitarian option, which 
is much closer to the alternative theory of utility that Holbach illustrates so well. This third option 
highlighted by Walzer (1977: 77) recognises that the application of preventive wars will lead to 
‘innumerable and fruitless wars’, as each state tries to strike early when the costs of intervention are 
low. As such, the use of preventive war is against the permanent utility of the society of nations, and 
Walzer clearly exposes a utilitarian argument against war that could have come straight out of 
Holbach’s works. For it is precisely a utilitarian argument that does not rest upon calculations, but 
the virtue ethics that Holbach was defending. Getting used to fighting preventive wars is vicious not 
because of the individual circumstances of each case, but because it leads to a habit of intervention.  
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 The ultimate failure of Walzer (1977: 231) to square the circle of utilitarianism is through his 
famous ‘utilitarianism of extremity’. Walzer had indeed spent a long time trying to defend the 
necessity of customs and conventions, yet he builds this utilitarianism of extremity precisely to 
bypass the laws of a theory of rights. This is unconvincing within Walzer’s theory, for it accepts in 
extreme cases a principle that it refuses at other times, but it would pose little problem under the 
Holbach’s utilitarian ethics. He could agree that there are evils so great as to demand the kind of 
action that Walzer advocates for. Of course, such extreme cases as the bombing of civilian targets 
would have to pass the test of legitimacy in Holbach’s ethics. It would have to demonstrate, at a 
minimum, that it is the utility of humanity, and not merely that of one of the belligerent countries, 
that such actions strives for. Yet because Holbach’s utilitarian thought is enshrined in virtue, it is 
possible for him to accommodate for such particular actions. The moral intuition that pushes Walzer 
back to utilitarianism in times of supreme emergency could then easily be encompassed within 
Holbach’s philosophy. There is no need, in other words, to move past utilitarian thought in order to 
come back to it, if one understands utility to be part of an ethical system where happiness, 
sociability and virtue have their proper role, and where self-interest is paramount.ii  
A materialist critique of democratic peace 
One important area of critique emanating from Holbach’s that has contemporary relevance is 
Holbach’s utilitarian critique of democratic peace. Steven Pinker’s Better Angels of Our Nature 
(2011) has reignited the debate about the supposed success of democratic peace – linking his thesis 
about the decline in violence throughout the world to the thought of Immanuel Kant and the idea of 
perpetual peace between republican polities. Unsurprisingly, Pinker’s thesis is closer to an 
understanding of security à la Bentham, than to a concern for safety à la Holbach, as illustrated 
above. For Pinker, the better angels are ‘referring to the advance of peace and human security’, not 
to increased safety and material well-being (2011: 34). For this reason, peace, as the absence of 
violent death, would be too weak for Holbach’s utilitarian ethics. Surely, violent deaths in conflicts 
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are concerning, but the emphasis on the security dimension of this theory obfuscates the 
importance of safety for human flourishing. Peace between states or between groups within states, 
is too narrow a focus for international ethics. Structural concerns, such as those who keep vast 
portions of humanity impoverished to the point where meaningful lives become an impossibility, 
would be equally worthy of attention. Holbach was very concerned with these conditions that kept 
the poor in subservient positions in society – he widely criticised the great inequalities of wealth in 
the Ancien Régime. Peace is not the ultimate goal – for it may enshrine and foster inequalities – but 
a fairer distribution of wealth would bring about additional safety for both individuals and countries. 
In eighteenth-century France, this meant distribution of land – the main source of wealth at the 
time, and Holbach clearly sided with the Physiocrats who argued for redistribution of arable land – 
despite his personal interest as a large land-owner due to his aristocratic background. Holbach’s 
defence of virtue utilitarian ethics was not purely abstract, as he was willing to concede that the 
interest of the greatest number lay in widespread ownership of land. It was both virtuous at the 
personal level (he would have had to give up his wealth), and at the political level: the widening of 
land-ownership would foster virtues in citizens, particularly by interesting them in the land and their 
fellow-citizens. It also acts as a critique of the mercantilist economic model, under which increased 
trade is the main source of wealth. Under these theories of unrestricted free trade, increased wealth 
may be achieved, but they do not guarantee its fair distribution throughout society. Instead of 
attaching citizens to the land, mercantilist ideals further create competition between merchants, 
with potentially belligerent consequences (Holbach, [1773b] 2004: 265). In other word, free trade 
does not create the virtues that Holbach wanted to see fostered by his utilitarian ethic. It denies that 
virtues are important, precisely by claiming that individual vices create public goods. Democratic 
peace, so often although not exclusively linked to this idea of liberal trade (Bell, 2013), grows less 
convincing after one takes the concerns of safety above those of security. If fair distribution of 
economic resources is taken seriously as an essential source of human safety, as Holbach does, the 
fall in violence is not the only concerns of the international ethicist.  
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There is a tension however, in Holbach’s works, between the ideal of citizenship and that of 
the universality between his two cardinal virtues: humanity and justice. In many ways, the tension 
reminds one of the cosmopolitan/communitarian debates in international theory, as it highlights the 
differences between the sense of belonging to a community, particularly one’s countryiii, and the 
wider duties towards the rest of humanity. Against a vision of the Enlightenment as a period 
uniquely concerned with universal values, a closer reading of Holbach reveals that the tension 
between cosmopolitan and communitarian ideals is already present within his work. As Jeffery says 
about the Scottish Enlightenment and Adam Smith in particular, there is a form of ‘indiscriminate 
partiality’ at stake (Jeffery, 2011: 156). Holbach’s thought is partial, in the sense that it is our 
interests, and in particular our interests as sociable beings, that drive us closer to our own 
community than to others. But crucially, Holbach’s ideal of citizens is driven by a partial attachment 
to the land, and to land-ownership (Holbach, [1773a] 2001:405-409). While a property requirement 
for citizenship sounds outdated for us, today, Holbach claims that it is through this material 
attachment to the land that one comes to care about the public good (Holbach, [1773b] 2004: 152). 
As Marx noted of the physiocratic school, they had the merit of being ‘the true fathers of modern 
political economy’ because of their ‘analysis of the various material components in which capital 
exists and into which it resolves itself in the course of the labour-process’ (Marx, 2000: 44). With all 
their faults – and Marx found many, the most obvious being for him their bourgeois horizon – the 
physiocrats enshrined social relations in material conditions. Holbach, who Marx and Engels (1999: 
110) also considered as hopelessly bourgeois, had argued that the ideal of citizenship should be 
fostered, or in other words, that material attachment to the land and to others will only come when 
the greatest number of people become property owners (Holbach, [1776b] 2004: 610). In order to 
become partial to their fellow-citizens, Holbach defended an enlarged citizenry: defined as a large 
class of property owners who possess the land on which they live.  
 Yet if it is the goal of his conception of citizenship to become partial to fellow-citizens 
through material attachment to the land, is there a contradiction between his ideal of citizenship 
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and his virtues of humanity and justice with their universalistic appeals? Once again, Holbach’s 
materialism is helpful to rebuke this contradiction. Human beings, irrespective of their country of 
origin, share some material interests in common. No happy life can thrive within food and shelter, 
with the basic material necessities for life. In addition, as mentioned above, and against the model of 
autarky advocated by Rousseau, Holbach argues that different countries depend on each other, 
creating bonds between them. These in turn demand that indiscriminate criteria, enforced by an 
independent tribunal. In other words, we are always partial towards people closer to us (members 
of our family, locality, or country), but this partiality needs to be mediated through an indiscriminate 
set of principles because we share enough material needs in common with other human beings and 
other societies to justify collective duties.  
 
Conclusion 
Holbach has much to contribute to international ethics. His nuanced conception of utility, combined 
with virtue ethics, provides a novel way to think about challenges in this field. I have shown the 
relative worth of Holbach’s work compared to Bentham’s, as the former has a lot to contribute over 
and above (as well as before) Bentham in international ethics. His concern for safety, as opposed to 
security, illustrates the concern that a utilitarian virtue ethics puts forward for the material well-
being of the worst-off in international relations. His challenge to the conception of sovereignty can 
act as a critique of the Westphalian model, by putting forward a defence of an international social 
contract and a universal league. His thought on war and peace, as well as those on commerce, act as 
critical points against the dominant paradigms of realism and liberalism in international relations 
theory. It is precisely Holbach’s challenges to these traditions, as well as to simplistic conceptions of 
self-interest, that prove useful for the international ethics scholar. Finally, I have shown that 
Holbach’s thought can be used to address some of the most potent challenges raised against 
utilitarianism in international ethics: particularly those of Walzer. Holbach, a materialist thinker, 
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could also provide an alternative to Marxist theories yet to be developed. Engels and Marx (1999: 
111) judged his political philosophy as ‘the historically justified philosophical illusion about the 
bourgeoisie just then developing in France’. Yet they failed to take seriously republican materialism, 
with its concern for great material inequalities. Holbach’s materialism proposes a blending of ethical 
and critical theory, where an ideal of self-sustaining citizenship is used as a lever against misery and 
exploitation. Holbach’s materialistic philosophy proposes a republican twist to international critical 
theory that can bypass the Marxist critique of ethical debate being secondary to material interests 
(Roach, 2009). 
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i Jefferson had a copy of Holbach’s System of Nature in his library, Hegel had also read the work, whom he 
attributed to Mirabeau (Hegel, 1955: 387)  – Holbach’s nom de plume – and I will detail Marx and Engels’ 
critique of Holbach later in this paper.  
ii Rawls, despite wanting to provide ‘a theory of justice […] that proves superior to the long dominant tradition 
of utilitarianism’ (1999: 179) equally fails to convince that the utilitarianism he attacks is not a straw man. 
Rawls’ conception of the utilitarian tradition is simplistic, taking for granted its quantitative dimension. 
Utilitarianism is grouped with cost-benefit analysis and the practice of weighing national interests as a mode of 
‘means-end reasoning’ dismissed outright as an ‘unworkable ideal’ that ‘will not be accepted by peoples’ 
(Rawls 1999: 179, 13, and 40 respectively). It is precisely a tradition of utilitarian thought that refuses these 
gross generalisations that I am uncovering here with Holbach’s work. 
iii The French words ‘pays’ and ‘patrie’ are used interchangeably by Holbach ([1770b] 1999:638). For 
simplicity’s sake, I have translated them into ‘country’ here, even though this term might lose some of the 
potency of Holbach’s calls for citizens to defend, serve, and be useful to their ‘patrie’. A full analysis of 
Holbach’s thought on the topic would prove fascinating, especially since he adopted French citizenship and 
thus the French ‘patrie’, and I hope to develop it in future works.  
